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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
J. GOLDEN

BARTON MOTOR COM~
PANY, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff,

Case No.
6871

vs.
CALVIN D. JACKSON,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATE.MENT OF THE CASE
This action was commenced on December 20, 195:7,
for speciHc performance of an alleged contract whereby
the defendant, CALVIN D. JACKSON, according to the
claim of the complaint ~ntered into a written agreement with
the plaintiff, J. GOLDEN BARTON MOTOR COMPANY,
INCORPORATED, to purchase a new Mercury Automobile from plaintiff and gave plaintiff che.cks in the sums
of $500.00 .and $3,680.00 respectively. The auto·mobile was
never delivered ·to the defendant an.d he stopped payment
upon the $500.00 c'heck. The defendant answe·red denying
that there was .a contract between the parties. On .March
8, 1958, the deposition of the defendant was taken befo·re
Lois P. Crowder in the office of the plaintiff's attorney.
On June 10, 1958, the plaintiff made a written motion for
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summary judgment, in favor of the plaintiff, of forfeiture
o.f the sum of $500.00 for nonperformance of the contract by
the defendant, and the defendant made an oral motion
for summary judgment of dismissal. These motions were
argued and at the request of the court, counsel presented
written memoranda of authorities. On December 15, 1958,
the C·ourt made and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of the plaintiff for
the sum of $500.00, as a forfeiture of liquidated damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The only evidence before the court consists of the defendant's deposition and four exhibits identified therein.
The essential facts as disclosed by these sources are as
follows:
Calvin Jackson, the defendant, went to the plaintiff's
place of business and during a conversation asked Dean
Roberts, the plaintiff's salesman, how much the defendant
could purchase a 1.\/Iercury Parklane for. The salesman said,
"For $500.00 I can get you that ~ar for about $100.00 a
month for 36 months." (Deposition, Page 13) The defendant assented to this and at the· request of plaintiff's salesman, executed and delivered his check in the sum of $500.00.
(plaintiff's exhibit ''2") and signed an invoice and order,
(plaintiff's exhibit "1") whereupon the price of the .automobile had been stated as $4,080.00, and on the left..Jhand
side had been written, "payable in 36 installments of $100.00."
(Deposition, Page 13 and 14) The salesman said th:at before
this could become a contract he would have to have it confirmed by the sales manager. He then showed the contract
to the sale·s manager, who wrote over the figure "$100.00"
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the figure "112" and some odd cents. He brought this back
to Jackson and said, "this will have to be $112.00." (Deposition, Page 14) Jackson said, "well, I guess that will be
alright," but did not, in writing, acknowledge any change in
the contract and no new contract was drawn. (Deposition,
Pages 19, 20, 21 and 24) After this, however, the salesman
went back to the sales manager and .came. back to Jackson
saying, "Dean made a mistake. The. payments will have to
be $118.00 a month." (Deposition, Page 14) Jackson said,
"I can't make those payments." Meanwhile, without Jacksons authorization and over his signature, the plaintiff's
ag~nt had writte·n over the figures previously placed th-ereupon the figure., "118.74." When the defendant refused to
accept these payments, the plaintiff's agents insisted that
they were going to run the contract .through Commercial
Credit for financing upon those terms. The defendant
insisted that he could not meet these terms and that he
was not willing to meet them and stated that he would
contact Continental Bank and see what he could do about
financing the automobile. (Deposition., Pages 14 and 15)
He gave his check to the plaintiff for $3,680.00, upon which
he wrote a statement to the effect that it was to be. cashed
or used only when or if the automobile should be financed.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit "3") The plaintiff's agents then wrote.
an additional provision upon the invoice and order form
to the following effect: "Cal has alternative for financing
from Continental Bank. $100.00 more if he does finance."
(Deposition, Pages 20 and 21) Thereupon the defendant left
the plaintiff's place of business .and on the f.oUowing day
s~opped

payment upon the $500.00 check.

(Deposition,

Page 18.)
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The alleged contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit "1") upon
which the plaintiff's claim is based is on a printed form
and contains the following written provisions:
Purchaser's N arne: Cal Jackson
Please enter my order for used Parklane 2 Dr. Hardtop
$4,000.00
Cash Selling Price
We will get
1958 Plates
Sales Tax
License & Transfer of Title
Total Cash Selling Price
Payable in 36" Installments of "$118.74

$ 80.00
$ 6.00
$4,080.00

Additional Information:
Cal has alternative for financing
from Continental Bank.
$100 more if he does finance.

By

Deposit herewith
Unpaid Cash Price
Balance
lsi George Karoulis

$ 500.00
$3,580.00

(Sales Manager or Officer of the Company)

The figure "$118.74" is obviously written over some
other figure which by the handwriting has become iiiegible.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
NO CONTRACT WAS EVER FORMED BETWEEN
THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT.
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POINT II
EVEN IF THE PARTIES HAD FORMED A BINDING CONTRACT IT WAS, BY ITS TERMS, CONDITIONAL AND THE CONDITIONS UPON WHICH IT
DEPENDED HAD NOT BEEN PERFORME.D; THEREFORE, SUCH CONTRACT IS UNENFORCEABLE.
POINT III
EVEN ASSUMING AN UNCONDITIONAL CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND A BREACH
OF THE SAID CONTRACT, THE PLAINTIFF
SHOWED NO DAMAGES FOR SUCH BREACH., AND
THERE IS NO GROUND SHOWN FOR THE FORFEITURE OF $500.00 AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
THEREFOR.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO CONTRACT WAS EVER FORMED BETWEEN
THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT.
It is fundamental in the law of contracts that fot" the
formation of a val~d contract there must be a mutual assent
or meeting of the minds. (12 Am. Jur. 515.)
A contract is not made so long as in the contemplation
of both parties thereto something tetnains to be done to
establish contract relations. (12 Am. Jur. 519.)
A qualified or conditional acceptance does not make a
binldirtg contract and destroys the original offer so that
a later unqualified acceptance cannot form a contract.
(12 Am. Jur. 543, Section 53.)
Where a portion of a contract relatirlg to the terms of
payment is left for future determination, the c:orttract is
incomplete and no action premised thereon is maintainable.
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(HIWAY MOTOR COMPANY VS. SERVICE MOTOR
COMPANY, 68 Utah, 65, 249 Pac. 133.)
In the present case, it is impossible to determine from
the evidence the price which was to be paid for this
automobile. It could be $4,100.00, $4,080.00, $4,086.00,
$4,180.00, $4,186.00, $4,774.64, or any one of several other
different prices computed by different combinations of the
plaintiff's contradictory figures.
If, as alleged in the complaint, there was a contract,
when and how was it formed? At the time when Jackson
had signed the invoice and order and delivered his check
in the sum of $500.00, there was no contract between the
parties because this proposal had not yet been accepted by
Barton Motor's authorized agent. At this point it constituted only a unilateral offer upon the part of Jackson.
At the time when the figure $100.00 was changed by
the plaintiff's agent to $112.00 there was no contract between the parties because while Jackson indicated his assent
to this change, he did not actually accept it and this was
later withdrawn by the plaintiff's sales manager by writing over this figure the figure "$118.74."
After this higher figure was inserted, there never
was any assent upon Jackson's part to the terms of the
altered instrument. Quite to the contrary, the evidence
clearly shows that this proposal was persistenly refused
by the appellant.
The only authority cited by the plaintiff is its Memorandum of- Authorities and the one on which the district
court apparently based its decision is the case of JENSEN'S
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USED CARS vs. JAME;S T. RICH, (7 U, 2d 276, 323 Pac
2nd, 259.) The facts in the J ense.n case as stated in the
opinion of this court are as follows :
"On August 12th or 13th the plaintiff's agent deUvered
a used car to the defendant who gave the agent a $200.00
check and signed a conditional sales contract in blank.
This contract was not used. On August 17th the defendant
stopped payment on the check. Nevertheless, on tbe next
day, August 18th, the defendant signed· another conditional
sales contract that contained clear, c~omplete terms including
the price. The defendant admitted all this. He has paid
nothing. After havin.g possessio·n of the car three months,
it was picked up because of the defendant's default in
payment." (Emphasis ours)
Certainly the Jensen case is not authority for the
fact that a contract had been formed between the parties
in the present cas.e. There, as shown by the above statement of facts, while a blank contract was signe·ci orginally,
this contract was not used an.d a later clear and complete
contract was signed. Under the evidence here before the
court it is impossible t.o determine e.ven the price for which
the automobile was to be sold.

POINT II
EVEN IF THE PARTIES HAD FORMED A BINDING CONTRACT IT WAS, BY ITS TERMS, CONDITIONAL AND TH.E CONDITIONS UPON WHICH IT
DEPENDED HAD NOT BE.EN PERFORMED; THEREFORE, SUCH CONTRACT IS UNFORCEABLE.
If a contract was ever formed between the parties, it
would have to be by the delivery of the defe-ndant's check

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

to the plaintiff in the sum of $3,680.00, and its acceptance by
the plaintiff. The check referred to (Plaintiff's Exhibit "3")
'
has written upon it a statement to the effect that "this check
must be held until and if I secure a loan for the amount
and release this to be cashed." At this point in the negotiations ,the plaintiff's agent wrote upon the invoice and
order under which it claims, the words, "Cal has alternative
for financing from Continental Bank, $100 more if he does
finance." Jackson did not subscribe this alteration in the
contract nor any of the previous ones.
If at this point a contract was formed between the
parties then such contract was subject to the terms and conditions stated, the principal one of which was the condition

that Jackson obtain financing from Continental Bank upon
the automobile. This condition was never performed.
SECTION 60-1-11, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
which is one of the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act
provides as follows:
"EFFECT OF CONDITIONS (1) Where the obligation of either party to a contract to seU or a sale is subject
to any condition which is not performed, such party may
refuse to proceed with the contract or sale, or he may
waive performance of the condition. If the. other party
has promised that the condition should happen or be performed, such first mentioned party may also treat the. nonperformance of the condition as a breach of warranty"'
There is no evidence of any promise or undertaking
upon the part of the defendant to finance the automobile
and the writing upon the invoice and order form is entirely
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that of the plaintiff's agents and should be construed most
strongly against the plaintiff.
POINT III
EVEN ASSUMING AN UNCONDITIONAL CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND A BREACH
OF THE SAID
CONTRACT, THE PLAINTIFF
SHOWED NO DAMAGES FOR SUCH BREACH, AND
THERE IS NO GROUND SHOWN FOR THE FORFEITURE OF $500.00 AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
THEREFOR.
The judgment of the District Court is for forfeiture of
$500.00 as liquidated damages for the nonperformance of
an alleged contract by the defendant. There is no evide.nce
before the court of any actual damage suffered by the
plaintiff for the breach of the alle,ged contract.

It is well established in the law of our state that where
parties to a contract stipulate the amount of liquidated
damages that shall be paid in case of a breach, such stipulation and contract is not enforceable if the amount of the
forfeiture is disproportionate to the amount of damages
actually suffered by the claiming party. This rule is announced and illustrated in a long and consiste.nt line pf
cases including PERKINS VS. SPENCER, 121 U. 468,
243 Pac. 2nd 446; YOUNG VS. HANSEN, 117 U. 591,
218 Pac. 2nd 666; CROFT VS. JENSEN, 86 UTAH 13;
40 Pac. 2nd 198; MALMBERG VS. BAUGH, 62 Utah 331,
218 Pac. 975; WESTERN MACARONI MANUFA,CTURING COMPANY VS. FIORE, 47 Utah 108, 151 Pac. 984;
and MciNTOSH VS. JOHNSON, 8 Utah, 359; 31 Pac. 450.
In the present case, there is no evidence before the
court which would indicate that the plaintiff has suffered
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any damage at all. If it has sold the automobile. which it
claimed to have sold to the defendant, then it is difficult
to see wherein its damage lies. The defendant has introduced as an exhibit an application for certificate of title
upon the automobile which has been signed in blank by
the defendant but which has obviously never been filled
out and presented to the Tax Commission (Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 4) It would appear, therefore, that the plaintiff has made no effort to actually transfer title to the
au.omobile to the defendant. The rule illustrated by the
above-quoted cases is founded on sound principle of equity
that a forfeiture which is disproportionate to actual damages is, in effect, a penalty and would result in the unjust
enrichment of the person receiving the same. Neither the
facts before the court nor the plaintiff's memorandum shows
anything which would justify a forfeiture in this case.
In the case of Jensen's Used Cars vs. Rich, Supra, the
Supreme Court upheld a forfeiture of $200.00 upon a used
car which the defendant had held and used for some
thre.e months after a contract was signed between the parties.
Obviously, this case cannot be taken as authority for the.
plaintiff's position that it should receive a forfeiture of
$500.00 where the defendant never accepted nor received
the automobile and where the plaintiff retained the exclusive possession, title and right to the disposition of the
automobile.
CONCLUSION
The holding of the District Court in the present case
is of grave concern to this appellant because it appears to
be contrary to all of the fundamental and accepted rules
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of law. If upheld, this de.cision would extend the sound
principle announced in the case of 1ensen's Used Cars vs.
Rich, Supra, to include a case such as the present one
where an automobile dealer, simply by changing the terms
of a contract over the other party's signature, may impose
upon such party whatever terms he might choose. The
evidence he.re is clear that while the changes were made
in Jackson's presence, they were made unilate.rally without
his consent and even over his protests and objections. Certainly a person who signs a form should not, by that fact,
become the unwilling victim of the other party's greed and
caprice.
The appellant knows of no case under the laws of the
State of Utah, or elsewhere, under which the decision can
be justified. Certainly, the 1ensen case is distinguishable
upon the fact and law. An extension of the ruling in that
case to cover the present circumstances would appear to
place automobile dealers in a preferred class under the law,
in that thy are not subject to the ordinary and accepted
laws concerning the formation of contracts.
Upon the basis of the foregoing the appellant submits
that the decision of the District Court in the instant case
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

BEN G. BAGLEY
Attorney for Defendant
and App.ellant
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